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A B S T R A C T   
This article reviews climate change mitigation policies implemented in five major emitting economies: China, the 
European Union, India, Japan and the United States. It analyses their historical performance in terms of energy 
system and greenhouse gas emissions indicators. In cases where policies aim to reduce future emissions, their 
target performance levels are assessed. The review centres on the sectors of electricity generation, passenger 
vehicles, freight transport, forestry, industry, buildings, agriculture, and oil and gas production. Most focus 
countries have implemented successful policies for renewable energy, fuel efficiency, electrification of passenger 
vehicles, and forestry. For other sectors, information is limited or very heterogeneous (e.g. buildings, appliances, 
agriculture) or there are few comprehensive policies in place (e.g. industry). The article further presents an 
explorative emissions scenario developed under the assumption that all countries will replicate both the observed 
trends in sector-level indicators and the trends that policies for future emissions reductions aspire to achieve. It 
shows that the global replication of sector progress would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 by about 
20% compared to a current policies scenario. All countries analysed would overachieve the emissions reduction 
targets in their post-2020 climate targets. However, the resulting reduction in global emissions by 2030 would 
still not be sufficient to keep the world on track for a global cost-effective pathway that keeps temperature in-
crease below 2◦C. The findings of this study emphasise the need for transformative policies to keep the Paris 
Agreement temperature limit within reach.   
1. Introduction 
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 [1], countries have 
committed to keeping the average global warming increase well below 
2 ◦C above pre-industrial levels and to pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5◦C 
to prevent dangerous impacts of climate change. Full implementation of 
countries’ contributions to GHG emissions reduction targets under the 
Paris Agreement, also known as Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs), is estimated to cover only half of the emissions reductions that 
would be required under a no-policy baseline by 2030 to stay on a global 
least-cost pathway consistent with keeping warming levels well below 
2◦C [2]. Further, emissions projections suggest that many countries, 
including several G20 members, will not achieve their NDCs, unless they 
implement additional policies [3]. Current policies are projected to 
reduce global emissions by only a third of that necessary for a least-cost, 
well-below-two-degrees pathway, compared to a no-policy baseline 
scenario assuming no new policies are put in place from around 2005 
onwards [2]. It is thus essential that national governments and other 
actors increase their climate change mitigation efforts. 
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For this process, it is essential to know by how much individual 
countries and the world as a whole are able to reduce their GHG emis-
sions. The official procedures established under the climate negotiations 
do not provide country-specific data on emissions reductions re-
quirements. Nevertheless, governments will need such information to 
heighten their ambition with regard to targets. 
Several studies have looked into the GHG emissions trajectories of 
major economies as projected by integrated assessment models for least- 
cost 2◦C scenarios, and quantified those emissions under the assumption 
of minimised global aggregate economic costs [4,5]. Fekete et al., 
Kriegler et al. and Roelfsema et al. quantified the impact on GHG 
emissions reductions of a global roll-out of successful policies and 
transitions toward decarbonisation at national and regional levels [6–8]. 
Climate Action Tracker provides country-specific mitigation scenarios 
under scaled-up climate action, including “good practice scenarios” [9]. 
However, the ex post assessment of policy impact conducted in the 
aforementioned studies were either not systematically conducted or not 
comprehensive in terms of the coverage of countries and sectors. 
This article conducts an extensive review of policies that have had an 
impact on GHG emissions in the past in major emitting economies and 
explores the potential impact on GHG emissions of replicating them 
globally at a similar level of ambition. The exercise presented in this 
article aims to investigate whether there is a correlation between policy 
interventions and GHG emissions reductions in the current political 
economy, and obtain insights into how countries could enhance miti-
gation action in the short-term by learning from other countries’ expe-
riences. The review looks at individual policies in the context of a sector, 
rather than taking a higher level, statistical approach as done by 
Eskander et al. [10]. 
This article builds on existing literature by making the policy review 
more comprehensive and providing an updated set of explorative sce-
narios. It examines implemented policies related to energy and climate 
change mitigation on a sector-level in key economies that are major 
emitters and it describes the historical performance of energy and GHG 
indicators influenced by such policies. Where relevant for the discus-
sion, this article also reflects on forward-looking policies, such as those 
concerning renewable energy, energy efficiency targets and the goals of 
international initiatives. The article then presents an explorative emis-
sions scenario devised under the assumption that all countries will 
follow the observed trends in sector-level indicators on energy use or 
GHG emissions after successful policy implementation. These quantita-
tive results are based on the assumption that it is possible to replicate 
successful sector policies and their impact observed in a few countries 
around the world [8]. The approach only allows regional variations in 
the roll-out of selected policies to occur in cases where measures are 
likely to come at a high public cost [11]. The underlying idea is that 
countries learn from each other and transfer knowledge on policy 
implementation between political settings, although not by direct 
copying of legislation [12]. An example of such policy transfers is the 
implementation of feed-in tariffs adjusted to local circumstances in 
Uganda and Thailand, based on the German experience [13]. 
The policy review focuses on the following five major emitting 
economies: China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan and the 
United States. Collectively, they accounted for 55% of global GHG 
emissions in 2018, including those caused by land use, land-use change 
and forestry (LULUCF) [14,15]. Besides their size in terms of emissions, 
criteria for selecting those countries were the relevance in global climate 
change politics, the potential to serve as flagships, the presence of 
advanced policy packages, stages of economic development, and data 
availability. Policies in other countries were also considered based on 
their importance in specific sectors (e.g. policies for energy efficiency of 
appliances in the Republic of Korea and LULUCF sector policies in 
Brazil) as well as on the findings of other policy reviews. Finally, an 
explorative quantitative assessment presents the calculated impact of 
global replication of successful sector policies on emissions at both the 
global level and the level of 12 major emitting countries. 
2. Data and methods 
The analysis consisted of two main elements: (1) the review of pol-
icies and their historical or projected impact on sector-level indicators, 
and (2) the explorative analysis of a GHG emissions scenario that uses 
the values of sector-level performance indicators achieved under suc-
cessful policies and applies those indicator values to other countries 
around the world. The study focusses on two scenarios: the current 
policies scenario and the replication of successful policies scenario. The 
former assumes that no additional mitigation action is taken beyond 
currently implemented climate policies. Current policies trajectories 
reflect the main adopted and implemented national policies, both 
economy-wide and for all sectors, as defined in Kuramochi et al. [16]. 
The latter assumes the global replication of successful sector and sub-
sector progress, implied by policies. 
The analysis of sector and subsector progress and the construction of 
the global replication scenario consisted of the five steps illustrated in 
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Fig. 1. 
The first step was to identify focus sectors and select indicators for 
progress in those sectors. A literature review provided insights into the 
importance and policy relevance of specific subsectors and areas, as well 
as their contribution to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. For 
example, the promotion of renewable electricity generation and the 
regulation of coal-fired power plants were identified as two separate 
policy areas. The policy review builds on and adds to the approach taken 
in Kriegler et al. and Roelfsema et al. and aims to further strengthen the 
evidence base on whether, and to what extent, policies implemented in 
the five major emitting economies have contributed to GHG emissions 
reductions [7,8]. Consulted sources include the Climate Policy Database 
and Kuramochi et al. [17,18]. The selected sectors covered 85% of 
global total GHG emissions in 2018 [19]: electricity generation, fossil 
fuel extraction, manufacturing industry, buildings, transport, F-gases 
(cross-sectoral), and LULUCF. 
The second step was to identify existing policies per sector, per 
subsector and per country for each of the focus countries. Where rele-
vant, the review was expanded to include other countries with insightful 
policies in specific sectors. The starting point for this review was Kur-
amochi et al., who compiled information on existing sector-level policies 
in 25 countries as of mid-2018, including the five major emitting 
economies that this study focuses on [20]. Another source of informa-
tion was the European CD-LINKS project, which performed surveys 
among national policy experts in order to identify key implemented 
policies for GHG emissions reductions, without limiting itself to those 
that primarily address energy and climate issues [21]. Several other 
reviews and studies were also examined, including the World Energy 
Outlook reports, an earlier study on good practice for GHG emissions 
reduction policies, a report on the impact of climate change action in the 
short term, and the Climate Action Tracker project with GHG emissions 
projections under implemented policies for about 40 countries [6, 
22–26]. Where required, this study complemented and updated existing 
studies by reviewing legislative texts. For some sectors, it was not 
possible to compile a comprehensive overview of policies within the 
scope of this study. In such cases, the review focused on those countries 
with a set of strong policies in those particular sectors. 
The third step was a review of literature and data sources to deter-
mine the net historical impact of the identified policies on GHG emis-
sions, and the relevant metrics. This revealed the historical trends in 
sector- and subsector-level GHG and energy indicators for a period of 
five to ten years, which then served as proxies to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the energy and climate policies in question. The analysis also 
considered forward-looking policies that aspire to achieve future emis-
sions reductions, such as sector and subsector targets and their support 
schemes. By comparing those to current values, it was possible to esti-
mate the progress of sector indicators in the future. The use of proxy 
indicators does not allow for distinguishing the policy impact from the 
impact exerted by other drivers, such as changes in the industrial 
structure. The data sources used include IEA [27,28], national GHG 
inventories, other national inventories, the ODYSSEE energy efficiency 
index (ODEX) [29], and documentation on individual policies and their 
impact assessments. A five-to ten-year period may not always be 
considered long enough to constitute strong evidence for the historical 
impact of policies, but it seems reasonable for climate change mitigation 
efforts, as, for many sectors, the implementation of policies to support 
the deployment of key low-carbon technologies and other drastic GHG 
emissions reduction measures only started around the 2009 Copenhagen 
climate conference (15th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)). 
It is also important to note that the assessment period of the per-
formance indicators and the implementation period of the policies 
reviewed do not always match. In some cases, enforcement of the policy 
started before the assessment period, in others during the assessment 
period. Another relevant observation is that it was not always possible to 
assess the performance of the policies in recent years, given that the 
available scientific literature is often a few years behind the latest sta-
tistical data. In some cases, it was not possible to provide figures or give 
a qualitative assessment of the impact because corresponding data was 
not available. 
The fourth step involved identifying the countries where the in-
dicators at the sector and subsector levels have improved quickest, and 
the associated policies that are likely to have contributed to the observed 
performance. This step compares the quantified indicators from step 3 
for the countries where data is available. The research does not 
decompose the impacts of individual policies. 
The fifth step was to provide projections of the historical sector 
trends and apply them to all other countries around the world, using two 
different models: a bottom-up spreadsheet calculation [20] and the 
energy model TIMER as part of the integrated assessment model IMAGE 
3.0 [30,31]. Energy- and industry-related GHG emissions and emissions 
of F-gases were projected by bottom-up calculations based on existing 
external scenarios [6] and by the TIMER model [8] (Appendix A). The 
GHG emissions of the LULUCF sector and agriculture sector were pro-
jected by GLOBIOM and G4M models (Appendix A). 
All projections in this study were harmonised to the historical 
emissions data for 2014. For Annex I countries, the data point is the GHG 
emissions inventory data reported to the UNFCCC [32], and for 
non-Annex I countries, data reported to the EDGAR database (all GHG 
excluding land use) and the FAO (land use emissions) [14,15]. The 
projections are expressed in terms of 100-year global warming poten-
tials (GWPs) from the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; IPCC-SAR GWPs) (for further 
details, see Appendix A and Supporting Information). More specifically, 
the impact of successful sector policies on GHG emissions was translated 
into parameters for use in both models. 
3. Review of existing sector-level policies and their performance 
indicators 
Table 1 presents an overview of the selected sector-level perfor-
mance benchmarks. The following sections review the sector-level pol-
icies implemented in the focus countries of this study, summarise the 
rationale for the selection of good practice policies and the quantifica-
tion of their performance indicators. They discuss the feasibility of 
achieving levels of performance in other countries in line with those 
indicators. The policy review centres on measures that explicitly target a 
specific sector. Policy measures that indirectly or implicitly influence 
sector indicators, such as emissions trading schemes or carbon or energy 
taxes, are in most cases not considered. Where the literature review 
reveals important and successful policies in countries other than those 
examined here, they are included in this section for completeness. 
The literature review showed that there is more information avail-
able on OECD countries than on emerging economies and developing 
countries, and that, in many cases, OECD countries have historically 
achieved higher performance levels and implement forward-looking 
Fig. 1. Overview of the five-step approach.  
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Table 1 
Overview of good-practice policy indicators.  
Sector (share in 
2018 global GHG 
emissions) [15] 
Subsector, policy 
area or policy 
action 
Indicator Historical global average 
performance 
Best performers among major emitting economies 
Historical performance and future 
policy target used for explorative 
scenario analysis 
Countries and examples of 
policies that contributed to good 
performance 
Electricity 
generation (25%) 
Electricity 
generation: 
Share of electricity 
generated through 
renewables 
Increase of the share of 
renewables in total 
electricity generation 
per year (percentage 
points) 
0.5% points increase in 
share per year (2005–2015) 
1.35% points increase in share per 
year excluding hydro 
(2005–2015) 
EU (Renewable Directive and 
Roadmap; Member States support 
schemes) 
Electricity 
generation: limits 
on coal-fired power 
plants 
Various: Cap on coal 
consumption or 
capacity; target year for 
phase out 
189 GW coal power (global) 
output from plants under 
construction (as of July 
2020) 
[Historical] Cancellation of 
several construction plans (China, 
Japan); forced closures of old and 
inefficient plants (China) 
[Forward-looking] No new coal- 
fired power plants after 2025 for 
OECD countries, and after 2035 
for developing countries 
[Historical] Coal consumption cap 
(China); environmental impact 
assessment (Japan) [Forward- 
looking] Canada, China, United 
Kingdom, India, several EU 
Member States (coal consumption 
cap, emission performance 
standards) 
Industry (fuel 
combustion and 
process 
emissions) and 
fossil fuel 
production 
(29%) 
Energy efficiency Final energy 
consumption per 
physical output 
Approximately 1%/yr 
energy intensity 
improvement 
[Historical] Up to 0.5% annual 
additional improvement (limited 
information available) 
EU (energy efficiency standards, 
air pollutant emission standards, 
emissions trading scheme); Japan 
(voluntary agreements) 
Oil and gas 
production: 
venting and flaring 
Implied CH4 emission 
factor per unit of oil and 
gas production 
Oil production: 1.8%/yr 
reduction of flaring CO2 
intensity (1996–2019) and 
2.9%/yr reduction of CH4 
intensity (1992–2012); 
Gas production: 0.5%/yr 
reduction of CH4 intensity 
(1992–2012) 
[Historical] 4.8% annual 
reduction in emission intensity 
between 2008 and 2015 (United 
States) [Forward-looking] Limited 
information available 
[Historical] United States (EPA 
Natural Gas STAR Program to 
encourage reductions; Waste 
Prevention Rule of the Bureau of 
Land Management to reduce 
flaring of gas) 
Buildings (7%) Energy efficiency 
in space heating 
and cooling 
Final gross energy 
consumption per square 
meter for new 
residential and 
commercial buildings 
(kWh/m2) 
Limited information 
available 
[Historical] Limited information 
available 
[Forward-looking] all new 
buildings to be nearly zero-energy 
by 2020 (EU) and 2030 (Japan) 
[Historical/forward-looking] EU 
(Energy Performance Buildings 
Directive: EPBD) 
Renovation rate for 
existing buildings 
Approximately 1%/yr [Historical] Limited comparable 
information available 
[Forward-looking] renovation 
rate 3% per year for public 
buildings; rate used in analysis for 
all residential buildings: 
2.1% per year (OECD countries) 
1.6% per year (China, Russia) 
1.5% per year (other regions) 
EU (EPBD) 
Efficiency 
standards for 
appliances 
Annual improvement in 
appliance efficiency (%) 
1%/yr efficiency 
improvement for appliances 
and lighting 
[Historical] About 0.5% annual 
additional to autonomous 
improvement; limited comparable 
information available [Forward- 
looking] Limited comparable 
information available 
[Historical] Japan (Top Runner 
Standards); EU (Energy Efficiency 
Directive, 
Ecodesign Directive, 
Energy Labelling Directive) 
Transport (13%) Passenger vehicles: 
fuel efficiency 
standards 
Average km/l for new 
registrations 
Light-duty vehicles fuel 
efficiency: 20 km/l (Japan, 
2013, test mode) 
[Historical] 13.7 km/l to 20.5 km/ 
l between 2001 and 2016 (Japan) 
[Forward-looking] 32 km/l by 
2030 (EU) 
Figure used in analysis: 27 km/l by 
2030 
[Historical] Japan, EU 
[Forward-looking] EU 
Passenger vehicles: 
market penetration 
of zero-emission 
vehicles 
Share of electric cars in 
new registrations (%) 
Share of new Electric 
vehicles: <1% 
[Historical] 0.3%–56% between 
2010 and 2019 (Norway) 
[Forward-looking] 100% zero- 
carbon vehicles in 2025 
Figures used in analysis: 25% 
share of new electric vehicles to be 
achieved in 2025 for OECD 
countries, and in 2035 for 
developing countries 
[Historical] Norway (subsidies, 
incentives for parking) [Forward- 
looking] Norway 
Freight transport: 
fuel efficiency 
standards 
Final energy 
consumption per tonne- 
km 
Limited data available [Historical] Limited comparable 
information available 
[Forward-looking] Limited 
comparable information available 
Figure used in analysis: new 
vehicle efficiency to improve 
between 2017 and 2030 at the rate 
previously suggested by the 
United States Standards Strategy 
[Historical] China, EU, Japan, 
United States 
[Earlier proposal] United States 
(fuel economy standards) 
F-gases (3%)  
(continued on next page) 
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policies with more stringent targets. For major emitting countries such 
as India and China, however, a less stringent target level often results in 
higher absolute numbers, for example in terms of electric vehicle sales or 
capacity additions for renewables. 
3.1. Electricity generation 
3.1.1. Increase in renewable electricity 
Table 2 presents support policies for the deployment of renewable 
electricity, and the historical growth of its share in total electricity 
generation between 2007 and 2017 in the focus countries. Globally, the 
share of renewables in electricity generation increased from 18% in 
2007 to 24% in 2017 (including hydro), which translates into an average 
increase of 0.6% points per year [28]. 
Of the major emitting countries and regions, the EU performed the 
strongest, thanks to support from both the EU Renewable Energy 
Directive and national-level policies. Between 2007 and 2017, the 
average yearly increase was 1.5% points with hydro included, and 
1.35% points, excluding hydro [33]. At Member State level, Germany, 
the UK and Denmark showed average yearly increases of 1.9%, 2.5% 
and 4.5% points respectively, for the same period. For China, the figure 
was 1% point, while it recorded an increase of more than 40% in total 
electricity demand over the same period. During those years, China set 
ambitious capacity targets and implemented financial incentives to in-
crease the production and deployment of renewable energy technolo-
gies. Japan and the United States also showed performance on par with 
or better than the world average. By contrast, India experienced a slight 
decrease in the share of Renewable Energy (RE) electricity over the 
observed period, while installed renewable technology capacities 
increased. The impact of falling technology costs and the 2016 National 
Electricity Plan was rather limited. Roelfsema et al. list a few other small 
countries that have achieved RE share growth rates well above the 
global average [8]. The size of the country impacts the indicator: RE 
capacity additions are the highest in China, but, because of the size of 
the country, the relative share changes only marginally [34]. 
3.1.2. Limits on coal-fired power plants 
In July 2020, there was 189 GW of coal-fired power plant capacity 
under construction globally [46]. Several economies have policies 
already in place or plans to limit electricity generation from coal-fired 
power plants (Table 3), and an increasing number of countries has set 
phase-out dates, or is in the process of doing so [3,47]. Some countries 
not covered by this study have already phased coal out of their energy 
systems. This section focuses on forward-looking policies, i.e. policies 
targeted at phasing out coal at a certain point in the future. 
None of the focus countries has set an explicit phase-out year for 
coal-fired electricity production. While some EU Member States plan to 
phase out coal-fired power plants [48], no target exists on the level of 
the EU as a whole. The target years set by Member States to phase out 
coal vary between 2020 in Austria and Sweden, and 2038 in Germany; 
Belgium shut down its last coal-fired plant in 2016 [49]. 
In China, the Energy Development Strategy Action Plan 2014–2020 
aims to cap coal consumption in 2020 at 4.2 billion tonnes of coal 
equivalent [50]. Government-affiliated research organisations project 
Table 1 (continued ) 
Sector (share in 
2018 global GHG 
emissions) [15] 
Subsector, policy 
area or policy 
action 
Indicator Historical global average 
performance 
Best performers among major emitting economies 
Historical performance and future 
policy target used for explorative 
scenario analysis 
Countries and examples of 
policies that contributed to good 
performance 
F-gas consumption 
(industry, buildings 
and transport) 
F-gas emissions 
reductions induced by 
policies (%) 
[Historical] Limited comparable 
information available 
[Forward-looking] 85% reduction 
to be achieved between 2035 and 
2045, compared to 2010 levels 
[Forward-looking] Kigali 
Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol 
Land use, land-use 
change and 
forestry (7%) 
Zero net 
deforestation 
Annual net deforestation 
area 
6 million ha/yr net forest 
loss 
[Historical] 83% reduction 
between 2004 and 2012 (Brazilian 
Amazon) [Forward-looking] End 
natural forest loss by 2030 
[Historical] Brazil, China, EU 
[Forward-looking] International: 
New York Declaration on Forests 
(endorsed by a large number of 
national governments) 
Other: Agriculture 
and waste (15%) 
Anaerobic digesters   50% of manure from livestock 
treated with anaerobic digesters 
by 2030 
[Historical] Germany, Denmark  
Rice paddies   Efficiency gains in GHG reduction 
of 2% per year by 2030 
[Historical] Vietnam  
Table 2 
Most relevant policies for the deployment of technologies for electricity gener-
ation through renewable energy (RE).  
Country/ 
region 
Main policy measures 
effective from 2007 to 
2017 
Historical growth of 
electricity 
generation through 
RE from 2007 to 
2017 [28] 
Share of 
electricity 
generation 
through RE in 
2017 [28] 
China Energy Development 
Strategy Action Plan 
2014–2020 [35]; 
Renewable Energy 
Development Five Year 
Plan with non-fossil and 
capacity targets for RE 
technologies [36]; 13th 
Five Year Plan for 
Energy Development 
[37]; several financial 
instruments for RE 
technology support (tax 
reliefs, feed-in tariffs) 
[38] 
1% point per year 25% 
EU Renewable Energy 
Roadmap (Directive 
2009/28/EC) [33]; 
Member States support 
policies and targets 
1.5% points per year 
including hydro and 
1.35% points per 
year excluding hydro 
30% 
Japan Long-term Energy 
Supply and Demand 
Outlook [39]; Feed-in 
tariff scheme (2012) 
[40] 
0.7% points per year 17% 
India National Solar and Wind 
Missions (2010) and 
various related support 
schemes [41]; National 
Electricity Plan [42] 
− 0.1% points per 
year 
16% 
United 
States 
State-level renewable 
portfolio standards 
(RPS) [43]; tax relief for 
renewable energy 
technologies [44,45] 
0.9% points per year 17%  
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that China’s coal capacity would peak in 2025 under current policies 
(including the cap on coal) [51]. The Japanese environment ministry 
regulates new coal-fired power plant constructions by examining their 
consistency with the national GHG mitigation targets under mandatory 
environmental impact assessments [52]. This policy has led to cancel-
lations of several new construction plans [53,54] while other projects 
were allowed to continue [55,56]. India’s National Electricity Plan ex-
pects a further net increase of coal-fired power capacity by 46 GW be-
tween 2022 and 2027 [57]. 
There are several examples of coal phase-out plans in countries not 
covered by this study. Canada has committed to phasing out its coal- 
fired power plants not equipped with carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technology by 2030 [58]. At sub-national levels, the Canadian 
province of Ontario phased coal out in 2014 [58], followed by the state 
of South Australia in 2016 [59]. In January 2018, Chile announced it 
would stop developing new coal-fired power plants and establish a 
calendar for the phasing out of coal [60]. 
3.2. Fossil fuel extraction: fugitive emissions 
This section covers policies that address methane (CH4) emissions 
from venting and flaring in oil and gas production. It also looks at 
reduced CH4 emissions from coal mining. 
3.2.1. Reduction of venting and flaring in oil and gas production 
While large GHG emissions reductions can be achieved in the oil and 
gas extraction sector [62,63], only a few countries have implemented 
policies to control this kind of emissions [24]. Data on fugitive emissions 
from oil and gas production is highly uncertain and is not available for 
all countries [65]. Historically, global average CO2 emission intensity of 
flaring per unit oil production reduced at 1.8%/yr on average between 
1996 and 2019 [64], while global average CH4 emission intensity per 
unit of oil and gas production reduced at 2.9%/yr for oil production and 
0.5%/yr for gas production on average between 1992 and 2012 [65]. 
Table 4 presents an overview of policies on venting and flaring in the 
oil and gas production sector. Among the policies implemented in the 
focus countries, the US approach to methane reductions is the only 
comprehensive policy package in this area. It covers the entire sector 
and attempts to achieve reductions that are significantly greater than the 
historical trends between 1990 and 2008. The United States aims to cut 
CH4 emissions from oil and gas production by 40%–45% from 2012 
levels by 2025. Although the US Environmental Protection Agency 
under the Trump administration proposed to change methane emission 
standards on oil and gas wells [66], no new regulations have not been 
introduced yet. 
Under the current rules, the US Energy Information Administration 
projected that the country would decrease its emission intensity to 77.4 
ktCO2e per Mtoe fuel produced by 2025 [67], which translates to an 
annual reduction of 4.7% [6]. The contribution of flaring to the GHG 
emissions of the US oil and gas sector is less than one-fifth of the total. 
The average annual reduction of the historical CH4 and CO2 emissions 
intensities from oil and gas operations between 2008 and 2015 was 
4.8%, according to data reported for that period [68]. 
In the EU, there are no union-wide policies directly targeted at 
reducing emissions from venting and flaring. The European Commis-
sion, however, does participate in networks for knowledge exchange on 
methane emissions reductions from oil and gas production [69]. 
In China, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric 
Pollution regulates fugitive emissions from the production of fuels, but 
only focuses on coal [70]. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed 
that the impact of this policy on methane emissions in the oil and gas 
production is limited. Those emissions have been stable in the past 
decade [71]. 
Table 3 
Most relevant policies on limiting coal-fired power plants.  
Country/ 
region 
Policy measures Indicator value Share of coal- 
fired electricity 
generation in 
2017 [28] 
China Energy Development 
Strategy Action Plan 
2014–2020 [35]; 13th 
Five Year Plan for 
Energy Development 
[37] 
Cap on coal 
consumption in 2020 
at 4.2 billion tce 
68% 
EU No policy on EU level 
directly targeted at coal- 
fired power plants. 
Some Member State 
policies have coal 
phase-out plans [61]. 
Varying target years 
for phasing out coal in 
Member States 
between 2022 and 
2038 
21% 
India National Electricity 
Plan [42]. 
N/A 74% 
Japan Environmental impact 
assessments [52] 
Best Available 
Technology 
benchmarks and 
consistency with the 
national GHG 
mitigation targets 
33% 
United 
States 
No policies N/A 28%  
Table 4 
Most relevant policies for GHG emissions reductions from venting and flaring in 
oil and gas production * (adapted from Roelfsema et al. [8]).  
Country/ 
region 
Policy measure Indicators value 
China Law on the Prevention and 
Control of Atmospheric Pollution 
[70,77] 
N/A. 
EU No regulation at the EU level N/A. 
United 
States 
USA methane target to reduce 
methane emissions by 40–45% 
from 2012 levels by 2025 (EPA 
proposal, included in Obama 
Climate Plan) [78]. 
EPA Natural gas START Program 
that encourages methane 
emissions reductions in the oil and 
gas sector [79]. 
Implementation of the Waste 
Prevention Rule [80] to reduce 
flaring of gas by capturing or use 
for production. 
77.4 ktCO2e/Mtoe oil and gas 
produced in 2025 or 4.7% per 
year intensity improvement. 
Historical average annual CH4 
and CO2 intensity improvement 
of 4.8% from 2008 to 2015. 
Russia Reduce flaring by 5% [74]. 
Companies are fined when not 
adhering to the defined limits. 
In addition, improvements of 
regulatory and legal framework, 
including market liberalisation 
and improving market access 
[75]. 
874 ktCO2e/Mtoe oil and gas 
produced in 2015, but no 
significant change in emission 
factor in the past ten years. 
Norway A CO2 tax on oil and gas 
production (starting in 1991) 
promoting carbon capture and 
storage options [76]. 
5.5 ktCO2e/Mtoe oil and gas 
produced in 2015, but no 
significant change in emission 
factor in the past ten years. 
CH4 and CO2 intensity 
improvement of 2.3% per year 
from 1990 to 2020. 
Canada Regulations Respecting Reduction 
in the Release of Methane and 
Certain Volatile Organic 
Compounds (Upstream Oil and 
Gas Sector) [81]. 
N/A 
Nigeria Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste 
and Pollution) Regulations 2018 
[82]. 
N/A 
*Japan and India are not included here because they do not produce relevant 
amounts of oil or gas. On the other hand, various countries that do not belong to 
the focus group of this study are included, given the relevance of their policies. 
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Countries that are not included in the focus group of this study and 
have relevant policies in the area of fugitive emissions from venting and 
flaring are Canada and Nigeria. Canada controls leakage and limits 
venting in upstream facilities [72]. Nigeria limits the flaring of gas and 
taxes the volumes of gas that facilities continue to flare under those 
limits [73]. Countries where policies exert less impact in this area are 
Russia and Norway. Russia aims at reducing flaring by 5% [74,75]. 
Norway has taxed CO2 emissions from oil and gas production since 1991 
[76]. 
3.3. Manufacturing industry 
3.3.1. Enhanced energy efficiency 
Table 5 presents the most relevant energy efficiency policies that 
have been implemented in the manufacturing industry. In 2008, India 
adopted the National Plan on Climate Change, which includes the Na-
tional Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency. The latter contains a 
market-based energy efficiency improvement programme called the 
Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme, under which industries are 
required to meet energy saving targets by either implementing energy 
efficiency measures or offsetting their excess energy consumption 
through the purchase of energy saving certificates. A recent study that 
reviewed the effectiveness of the PAT scheme during its first cycle 
(2012–2015) concludes that the energy saving targets were no more 
stringent than those set for the business-as-usual scenarios [83]. 
In the EU, the main policies that address industrial energy efficiency 
are: (1) the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS; 2003/87/EC); (2) the 
Energy Efficiency Directive (EED; 2012/27/EU), which encourages the 
EU Member States to make use of various financing channels for mea-
sures that serve to meet the EU-wide target of a 20% improvement in 
energy efficiency by 2020; and (3) the Industrial Emissions Directive 
(IED; 2010/75/EU), which principally addresses pollutant emissions, 
but also requires industrial operators to consider the overall environ-
mental performance of their plants by covering energy efficiency, ma-
terial use and several other elements [84]. An extensive review study 
suggested that CO2 emissions from sectors covered by the EU Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) declined compared to estimated 
business-as-usual emissions during its first two phases but the study 
could not determine a causal relationship between the scheme and 
emissions reductions [85]. Another review also pointed out that large 
overlaps may exist between the three EU initiatives with regard to re-
ductions in greenhouse gas emissions [86]. 
The ODYSSEE energy efficiency index (ODEX) is used to measure 
progress in energy efficiency by sector. It is a weighted average of 
subsector physical output-based energy efficiency indices. According to 
this index, energy efficiency in the EU industry sector improved at an 
average yearly rate of 1.8% between 1990 and 2014 and 1.3% between 
2005 and 2014 [29]. Compared to the typical value of about 1% per year 
for autonomous energy efficiency improvement [87,88], the historical 
trends suggest that the policies that were in place constituted an addi-
tional energy efficiency improvement. These results, however, should be 
interpreted cautiously as the ODEX is considered to be less scientifically 
robust than other established energy efficiency indices [89–91]. 
China’s current high-level policy for industry energy efficiency is the 
Climate Change Action Plan (2014), which aims to reduce industrial CO2 
emissions per unit of added value by 50% by 2020 compared to 2005 
levels. Moreover, the China Manufacturing 2025 initiative aims to 
reduce energy intensity per unit of added value for enterprises above a 
designated size by 18% in 2020 and 34% in 2025, compared to 2015 
levels. To achieve these targets, it identifies ten key policy tools, 
including standards, subsidies, financial policies and government- 
backed investment funds [92]. 
In Japan, the main energy efficiency measures in the industry are 
Keidanren’s Voluntary Commitment to a Low-Carbon Society, and the 
sector benchmarks introduced in 2010 under the amended Energy 
Conservation Act. The former is an extension of the Voluntary Action 
Plan (VAP) that started in 1997 as part of the government plan to ach-
ieve the mitigation target under the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. As with the VAP, the targets under the Commitment are 
set unilaterally by the industry and oversight is also carried out by the 
industry, leading to questions on compliance, transparency and ambi-
tion levels [93]. To date, the benchmarks have not been effective, partly 
due to the lack of a penalty for non-compliance. In 2015 none of the four 
integrated steelmakers and only five of seventeen cement companies 
achieved the benchmarks [94]. Energy efficiency in the Japanese in-
dustry sector, measured on a physical output-basis, improved at an 
average yearly rate of 0.4% between 1991 and 2008 and 0.9% between 
2000 and 2008 [95]. 
Although there is limited evidence available, the case of the EU 
suggests that an additional energy efficiency improvement of roughly 
0.5% per year would be possible by introducing a comprehensive policy 
package. The figure is comparable to others that have been established 
in bottom-up scenario studies. An aggressive energy efficiency scenario 
based on the technical potential of energy efficiency improvement pre-
sented in the Global Energy Assessment [96] foresees a 2% per year 
improvement. On the other hand, the United Nations Industrial Devel-
opment Organization [97] projected that replacing all plants with cur-
rent best available technologies in the next 25 years (base year: 2005) 
would only lead to an efficiency improvement of 1.7% per year. 
The United States has a few, mostly non-regulatory, policies to 
enhance industrial energy efficiency [98]. One of these is the Superior 
Energy Performance (SEP) 50001 Program, which certifies industrial 
operators that implement an energy management system that meets the 
ISO 50001 standard, and demonstrate they have actually improved their 
energy efficiency [99]. The Better Plants Program is a voluntary part-
nership under which industrial actors set specific energy efficiency goals 
and receive support from the government to achieve their goals. 
3.4. Buildings 
3.4.1. Enhanced efficiency of space heating and cooling 
There are not many examples of policies that address renovation 
rates and energy performance of existing buildings (Table 6). For new 
buildings, the EU Energy Performance of Buildings Directive [106] is 
among the most ambitious measures, requiring all new buildings to be 
nearly zero-energy by 2020 [106]. The exact definition of nearly 
zero-energy varies across EU Member States [107]. Germany has re-
quirements for the refurbishment of existing buildings and mandatory 
standards for new ones [108]; new buildings consuming less than 40 
kWh/m2 per year in primary energy terms receive additional financial 
support. 
Table 5 
Most relevant policies for energy efficiency in the industrial sector.  
Country/ 
region 
Policy measures Historical energy efficiency 
improvement (physical 
output-based) 
China Various measures under the 12th 
and 13th Five Year Plans 
(2010–2015, 2015–2020) [35]; 
Made in China 2025 (2015) [100] 
N/A 
EU Energy Efficiency Directive (2012) 
[101]; Industrial Emissions 
Directive (2010) [84]; Emissions 
Trading Scheme (2003) [102] 
1.8% per year from 1990 to 
2014 (1.3% per year from 
2005 to 2014) 
India PAT scheme [41] under Mission for 
Enhanced Energy Efficiency (2008) 
N/A 
Japan The Keidanren VAP (1997) [103] 0.4% per year from 1991 to 
2008 
0.9% per year from 2000 to 
2008 
Sector benchmarks (2010 
amendment of the Energy 
Conservation Act) [104] 
United 
States 
Superior Energy Performance (SEP) 
50001 Program [99] 
Better Plants Program [105] 
N/A  
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The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive also requires Member 
States to create national plans for promoting the conversion of existing 
dwellings to nearly zero-energy, but there are no clear targets. The En-
ergy Efficiency Directive [101] further requires Member States to 
annually renovate 3% of the total floor area of buildings owned and 
occupied by the central government, but there are no renovation targets 
for other buildings. 
In the United States, the state of California also aims for all new 
residential and commercial buildings to be zero net energy by 2020 and 
2030, respectively [109]. The term zero net energy is defined as the 
situation that occurs when “the value of the net amount of energy pro-
duced by on-site renewable energy resources is equal to the value of the 
energy consumed annually by the building” [110]. At the federal level, 
building codes and labels are the dominating tools to support efficiency 
in buildings [111,112]. 
Japan has set the target of reducing the average net primary energy 
use of all new commercial buildings and dwellings to zero by 2030 under 
the 2014 Basic Energy Plan, with an interim 2020 target of the same 
reduction applying to 50% of all new commercial buildings and dwell-
ings [113]. Japan includes both fully zero-energy and nearly 
zero-energy dwellings in its targets, with nearly zero being defined as 
achieving a reduction of 75% or more in net primary energy use. In 
2017, the share of zero-energy and nearly zero-energy dwellings in new 
residential buildings was 10.5% [114]. 
China promotes the construction of nearly zero-energy buildings 
through large-scale demonstration projects and the development of new 
standards. The country’s definition of nearly-zero depends on the 
climate zone: heating demand must be below 18 kWh/(m2*yr) in the 
severely cold climate zone, below 15 kWh/(m2*yr) in the cold climate 
zone and below 5 kWh/(m2*yr) in other climate zones [115]. While 
China has mandatory building codes, there is no requirement for all new 
buildings to be classified as nearly zero-energy. 
3.4.2. Energy efficiency standards for appliances 
Table 7 summarises good practice policies on energy efficiency of 
appliances in the focus countries of this study and the Republic of Korea. 
Japan adopted the Top Runner Program in 1998 to establish energy 
efficiency standards for machinery, equipment and other items as part of 
the national plan to achieve the GHG mitigation target within the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol [122]. Under this programme, 
manufacturers are required to achieve the energy efficiency targets 
based on the most efficient products available on the market at the time 
they are set. With regard to target stringency, Tojo [123] concludes that 
manufacturers “must be at least as well-equipped with technologies as 
their counterparts abroad” to meet and exceed the Top Runner 
standards. 
The Top Runner Program is successful in enhancing the energy ef-
ficiency of appliances. The median of compound average improvement 
rates for 24 appliances (including heating, cooling and cooking devices) 
over periods of 4–9 years was 3.7% per year (authors’ own calculation 
based on data published by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry [122]). On average, these 24 appliances overachieved their 
efficiency targets by 0.9% per year (ibid.). 
In the EU, energy efficiency of appliances is promoted by a number of 
Directives, including the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
(2010/31/EU), the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU), the 
Ecodesign Directive (2009/125/EC), and the Energy Labelling Directive 
(2010/30/EU). The Ecodesign Directive sets minimum requirements on 
energy efficiency for appliances to be introduced in the European mar-
ket [29]. 
Between 1990 and 2014, energy efficiency in the EU household 
sector increased at an average rate of 1.7% per year based on the ODEX 
(see Section 3.3.1 on industrial energy efficiency). Similar energy effi-
ciency improvement rates were observed for large electric appliances, 
such as dishwashers, refrigerators and freezers, televisions and washing 
machines. As pointed out in the section on industrial energy efficiency, 
the results from the ODEX need to be interpreted with caution. 
The Republic of Korea, another major manufacturer of electric ap-
pliances, has four key energy efficiency policies: energy labelling, high- 
efficiency equipment certification, standby power reduction, and sub-
sidies for high-efficiency products [124]. No information was found on 
the effectiveness of these policy measures. 
The policies based on performance standards of both Japan and the 
EU are assessed to have delivered similar levels of energy efficiency 
improvement for appliances [125]. Based on the assessments of the Top 
Runner Program, and assuming that the efficiency improvement targets 
are at least at the level of autonomous efficiency improvement, histor-
ical observations for new products show that an additional efficiency 
improvement of about 1% per year can be realised. This roughly 
Table 6 
Most relevant policies for low-carbon installations in buildings (adapted 
from Roelfsema et al. [8]).  
Country/ 
region 
Existing policy measures Indicator value 
China The 13th Five-Year Plan for Energy 
and Resource Conservation by 
Public Institutions [116]; 
Green Building Evaluation 
Standard [117] 
Evaluation Standard for Green 
Retrofit of Existing Buildings [118] 
N/A 
EU Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive (2010) [119] 
All new buildings to be nearly 
zero-energy by 2020 
India Energy Conservation Building 
Code 
Rules, 2018 [120] 
N/A 
Japan Basic Energy Plan (2014) [113]; 
Zero-Energy House/Building 
Roadmap (2015) [121] 
All new buildings to be on 
average net zero-energy in 
primary energy terms by 2030 
United 
States 
Federal level: Energy efficiency 
codes and labels [111,112]; 
California: Building Efficiency 
Standards [109,110] 
Federal level: Not assessed; 
California: All new residential 
buildings to be zero net energy 
by 2020; 
All new commercial buildings 
to be zero net energy by 2030  
Table 7 
Most relevant policies on the energy efficiency of appliances (adapted 
from Roelfsema et al. [8]).  
Country/ 
region 
Policy measure(s) Indicator value 
China Mandatory standards; One 
Hundred Energy Efficiency 
Standards Promotion Program 
[128] 
N/A 
EU Energy Efficiency Directive 
(2012/27/EU); 
Ecodesign Directive (2009/ 
125/EC); 
Energy Labelling Directive 
(2010/30/EU) [29] 
Stock average: average efficiency 
improvement of 1.7% per year 
between 1990 and 2014 
India BEE Standards & Labelling 
Programme [129] 
N/A 
Japan Top Runner Program efficiency 
standards (1998) [122] 
New products: average efficiency 
improvement (median of 24 
products) of 3.7% per year over 
varying periods (4–9 years) 
United 
States 
Standards and labels for 
multiple technologies [127] 
N/A 
Republic of 
Korea 
Energy efficiency label and 
standard programme (1992); 
High-efficiency appliance 
certification (1996); e-Standby 
program (1999); 
High efficiency product 
subsidies (2001) [124] 
N/A  
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translates into a figure of 0.5% per year for stock average, which is 
consistent with a scenario under moderately strengthened policies 
developed by the Japanese Ministry of the Environment [126]. The 
historical trends observed in the ODEX of the EU suggest a similar 
magnitude of policy impact. 
In the USA, the Department of Energy works under the Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act to develop standards that regulate the maximum 
energy consumption of all main appliances. In this regard, “Energy Star” 
is the most prominent label for electric devices [127]. China has 
mandatory standards as the backbone of efficiency improvements in 
appliances. This area is being further developed through the One Hun-
dred Energy Efficiency Standards Promotion Program [128]. 
3.5. Transport 
3.5.1. Light-duty vehicles: standards for fuel efficiency and GHG emissions 
Fuel efficiency standards for light-duty vehicles (LDVs) are well 
developed in many economies. All the focus countries of this study have 
implemented fuel efficiency standards or GHG emission standards for 
passenger cars. In the shift towards zero-carbon mobility, the efficiency 
of the combustion engine becomes irrelevant. This policy review 
therefore refrains from providing an in-depth discussion of this subsec-
tor and acknowledges the importance of efficiency of electric vehicles. 
In 2017, the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) 
published an up-to-date overview of implemented standards for cars 
[130]. See Table 8 for relevant details. 
The EU policies represent good practice, having set the most ambi-
tious standards currently in force. Annual efficiency improvement up to 
2030 is set to go slightly beyond the maximum figure of 4% required by 
the Transportation Roadmap [131]. Furthermore, with regard to fuel 
economy, a significant gap exists between official figures (established 
under test conditions) and on-road figures, which are 30% lower [132]. 
Using the target of 4% per year improvement and making an adjustment 
of 30% for on-road performance, the good practice policy target (for 
on-road performance) in this study is 105 gCO2/km or 26.6 km/l by 
2030 for new cars (Table 1). 
3.5.2. Light-duty vehicles: support for electric vehicles (EVs) 
Support for EVs is increasing in many countries, including the focus 
countries of this study (see Table 9). 
In September 2017, China passed quotas on new vehicle sales for 
large car manufacturers and importers [136]. The quotas, 10% for 2019 
and 12% for 2020, can also be met by purchasing credits, which is why 
the actual share of electric vehicles will be lower than the quota [137]. 
In 2019, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released 
its 15-year EV plan for public commenting, aiming for 25% of new 
light-vehicle sales to be electric models by 2025 [138]. 
In its National Electric Mobility Mission, India set a sales target of 
6–7 million electric vehicles for 2020. This translates into 2–4% of the 
total vehicle stock, depending on different demand forecasts. India has 
been discussing targets for 2030, with possible options being abandon-
ing the sale of fossil fuel combustion engines, and requiring that a 30% 
share of the vehicle stock be electric [139]. Singh et al. [140] estimate 
that India will reach this target with the successful implementation of 
various policies currently on the table. 
In the EU, there is no union-wide regulation directly targeted at 
increasing the share of EVs. However, they count as zero-emission ve-
hicles and as such can be used to meet the emissions standards. France 
and the UK aim to have no fossil fuel vehicles by 2040, the Netherlands 
by 2030. 
Japan has a long history of support for EVs, going back to 1996 
[141]. Since then it has had subsidies in place for the purchase of EVs. It 
further provides tax rebates and has installed a dense charging infra-
structure [142]. The long-term goal and strategy of Japan’s automotive 
industry for tackling global climate change is to reduce passenger car 
emissions by 90% by 2050. The strategy includes interim targets for 
electric mobility: by 2030, the diffusion rate of battery and plug-in 
electric vehicles is to reach 20%–30% of new sales, and that of hybrid 
vehicles is to reach 30%–40% [143]. 
As for the United States, there is federal level support for EVs in the 
form of tax rebates. EVs can also be used to comply with the fuel effi-
ciency standards (see Section 3.5.1). Many states provide additional 
support, with the most comprehensive and ambitious policy package 
being California’s Zero-Emission Vehicle Program. Its goal is to reach a 
stock of 5 million EVs by 2030 and to install 250,000 charging stations. 
Besides other measures, this programme requires manufacturers to 
ensure a specific share of their sales is in fully electric or plug-in hybrid 
vehicles. The support policies also provide financial incentives for zero- 
emission vehicles [144]. The federal agency EPA projects that, with the 
policies implemented today, the EV share of overall vehicle sales will 
increase to 9% in the USA as a whole by 2030 [145]. 
Interesting policy packages exist beyond the study’s focus countries: 
the governments of Norway, the Netherlands, and California have 
implemented comprehensive packages to support the uptake of electric 
cars. These consist of financial incentives, along with investments in Table 8 
Overview of fuel efficiency or GHG emissions standards for passenger cars.  
Country/ 
region 
Policy measures Target 
Year 
Unadjusted Fleet 
target 
China Light duty fuel efficiency 
standard 
2020 
2025 
20 km/l 
25 km/l 
EU Light-duty CO2 emissions 
standard 
2021 
2025 
2030 
95 gCO2/km 
81 gCO2/km 
59 gCO2/km 
India Light-duty CO2 emissions 
standard [133] 
2022 113 gCO2/km 
Japan Light duty fuel efficiency 
standard 
2020 
2030 
20.3 km/l 
25.4 km/l 
United 
States 
Light duty fuel efficiency and 
emissions standard 
2025 23.5 km/l or 91 
gCO2/km 
Source: Adapted from Refs. [130,134]. The fuel efficiency and GHG targets are 
based on different test cycles and specifications, which means they are not fully 
comparable. For a few countries the values from the original source were con-
verted for comparability reasons. The original values are: 5 l/100 km for China, 
55.2 mpg and 147 gCO2/mi for United States. To obtain the EU figures, relative 
reductions were applied compared to the 2021 limits: 15% for 2025, and 37.5% 
for 2030. The Trump administration aims to replace the current regulation and 
freeze the efficiency requirements at 2020 levels [135]. This change is still going 
through legislative processes and in the meantime, the 2025 target remains in 
place. 
Table 9 
Overview of policies to support electric passenger cars.  
Country/ 
region 
Policy measures Market penetration of zero- 
emission vehicles 
China Quota for sales of new vehicles; 
financial incentives 
10% in 2019 and 12% in 2020 
Planned: 25% in 2025 
EU No EU-level regulation: 
Phase out combustion engine at 
member state level: 
France 
The Netherlands 
100% by 2040 
100% by 2030 
India National Electric Mobility 
Mission Plan 2020 [146] 
6–7 million vehicles by 2020 
(roughly 2–4% of market 
according to demand estimates) 
Japan Tax incentives and subsidies; 
long-term target for increase of 
electric vehicles [143] 
20–30% by 2030 for battery and 
plug-in EVs; roughly 3% for fuel 
cell electric vehicles 
United 
States 
Tax incentives on federal level; 
various states have additional 
support programmes and targets; 
California Zero-Emission Vehicle 
Program [144], Clean Cars 2040 
Act 
9% by 2030 
California: 5 million zero- 
emissions vehicles by 2030; 
planned: 100% zero-emission 
vehicle sales as of 2040  
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charging infrastructure and incentives for behavioural change, such as 
the right to drive on bus lanes, and free public parking. 
Assessments of this multi-layered policy package confirm that it 
effectively contributes to higher levels of EV sales [147]. Norway, for 
instance, achieved an EV market share of 56%, including plug-in hy-
brids, in 2019 [148] and aims at increasing this to 100% zero-carbon 
vehicles in sales of new cars in 2025 [149]. 
Costa Rica has not yet set targets for electric vehicles but is 
comprehensively supporting purchase and use through tax incentives, 
charging infrastructure, and changes to the fleets of public institutions 
[150]. Many cities, including Copenhagen, Oxford, Paris and numerous 
Chinese cities, have decided to ban fossil-fuel combustion engines from 
their streets by 2030 at the latest [151]. 
3.5.3. Heavy-duty vehicles: fuel efficiency standards 
Given that freight transport is heterogeneous and adjusted to the 
circumstances of individual countries, this study refrains from giving a 
comprehensive overview and provides several examples of interesting 
policies instead. Fuel efficiency for heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) has been 
much less regulated than for LDVs, but an increasing number of coun-
tries has implemented fuel economy standards in the past ten years 
[152]. Canada, China, Japan and the United States are forerunners to-
wards more fuel-efficient HDVs, with China and the United States being 
the only ones whose standards extend beyond 2020 [152]. In particular, 
the United States has comprehensive and ambitious standards in place 
[153]. These apply to the period 2021 to 2030 and seek to achieve an 
average yearly efficiency improvement of 1.7%1 for new HDVs [153]. 
China has implemented stages I and II of a fuel consumption standard for 
new heavy commercial vehicles. Stage I was in force from 2012 to 2015, 
and stage II affects HDVs as of 2015. In addition, China is now working 
on stage III, which is to apply to new lorries as of 2021 [154]. While the 
current fuel efficiency is lower than that of, for example, the United 
States, the rates of improvement implied by the standards are higher: the 
shift from stage II to stage III involves a yearly improvement of 2.4%. 
The electrification of on-road freight transport will play a crucial role 
in decarbonising the transport sector. Today, technologies are also 
available to fuel buses with electricity while running, in addition to on- 
board batteries. While installations have been created to test these 
technologies, no large-scale sites for commercial production have been 
built yet, nor do policies exist to promote production. Due to the lack of 
examples of good practice, this analysis does not examine HDV energy 
efficiency initiatives in further detail, and leaves them out of the 
enhanced policy scenarios. 
3.6. Reduction of emissions of fluorinated greenhouse gases (F- 
gases) 
With the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, governments 
agreed to a global phasing out of the consumption of hydro-
fluorocarbons (HFCs). The schedule varies by country group, with 
developed countries required to decrease HFC consumption sooner and 
to lower levels than developing countries (see Table S3 in the Supporting 
Information). Several countries have implemented national legislation 
to regulate F-gases (see Purohit et al. [155] and Table 10 for an over-
view): the EU introduced the F-gas regulation in 2014 [156]; the United 
States has updated its Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) Pro-
gram, which designates alternative uses for ozone-depleting substances 
[157]. The EU might be able to achieve its Kigali target with existing 
policies, while there are differing views on whether Japan and the 
United States could achieve theirs with the policies they have in place 
[158,159]. 
The EU F-gas regulation aims for a 66% reduction of all F-gas 
emissions relative to 2010. The legislation includes limiting the total 
amount of F-gases sold, banning the use of F-gases in specific appliances, 
preventing emissions from equipment during their service life, and 
introducing recycling or disposal measures [160]. 
China is a major emitter of F-gases and has started to regulate its 
emissions by tightening the control of enterprises which generate F- 
gases as by-products [161]. India has implemented an hydrochloro-
fluorocarbon (HCFC) Phase Out Management Plan, currently at stage 2, 
which aims at reducing HCFC production and consumption. According 
to the Indian government, this plan will bring about reductions faster 
than required under the Kigali Amendment [162]. 
Japan implemented the Act on Rational Use and Proper Management 
of Fluorocarbons to better control the F-gas chain in 2015. Specific 
measures are GWP targets for certain types of equipment and the obli-
gation to destroy F-gas for entities re-using recovered F-gases [163]. The 
Ozone Layer Protection Act states that the Kigali Amendment applies to 
Japan (ibid.). 
The 2019 amendment establishes several obligatory measures and 
penalties on non-compliance to increase the F-gas recovery rates to the 
targeted 50% by 2030 from 38% in 2017. 
The global replication of successful policies scenario assumes re-
ductions of HFC emissions according to the Kigali Amendment schedule 
(Table S3 in the Supporting Information) and expands these reductions 
to the use of other F-gases (PFCs and SF6), as significant reductions are 
technically possible and already being implemented. Most PFC emis-
sions from aluminium production could be reduced by 85% if producers 
changed to the processes with the lowest emission factors [164], and 
43% of business-as-usual emissions from semiconductor manufacturing 
could be abated at breakeven costs [165]. SF6 used in electrical equip-
ment has a practical recovery rate of 80%, and SF6 in the production of 
magnesium can be replaced by HFC-143, which has a shorter atmo-
spheric lifetime [166]. 
3.7. Agriculture 
The agricultural sector is highly heterogeneous in its structures and 
resulting GHG mitigation strategies, and depends strongly on the de-
mand side. For example, the reduction of meat consumption is an 
important lever. This study was not able to address the sector as a whole 
in a comprehensive manner, and therefore centres on two areas in which 
several countries have implemented successful policies and measures 
that can be replicated elsewhere. While these countries do not belong to 
the study’s focus group, the examined policies are relevant to this 
research. 
Table 10 
Overview of policies to reduce F-gas emissions.  
Country/ 
region 
Policy measures Target reduction rate and year 
China Inspection of enterprises and 
subsidies for destruction of HFCs 
[161] 
N/A 
EU F-gas regulation [167] 66% reduction of all F-gases 
relative to 2010 by 2030 
India HCFC Phase Out Management 
Plan 
reduction of HCFC production 
and consumption to 50% below 
2009–2010 levels in 2020, and 
60% in 2023 
Japan Act on Rational Use and Proper 
Management of Fluorocarbons 
[168]; Ozone Layer Protection 
Act [169] 
N/A 
United 
States 
Significant New Alternatives 
Policy (SNAP) [157] 
N/A  
1 Calculation based on the required efficiency of new lorries in tonnes-km/l 
across Class 7 and Class 8, using the average of the values for lorries with 
low, medium and high roofs. 
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3.7.1. Widespread use of anaerobic digesters 
In 2000, Germany passed its Renewable Energy Act, which provides 
incentives for electricity generation from renewable energy by offering 
above market feed-in tariffs. Subsequently, the number of biogas in-
stallations rose from around 1000 to more than 9000 in the period be-
tween 2000 and 2016. In 2015,the installed capacity totalled 4200 MW 
[170]. The first feed-in tariffs and bonuses for biogas paid under the Act 
– and a revised version of the legislation in 2004 – were as high as EUR 
22 cent/kWh [171]. Manure is one of the feedstocks used in anaerobic 
digesters to produce methane, and the CH4 emissions reduction from 
proper manure management can reach 90% [172]. A 2014 reform of the 
Renewable Energy Act aimed to reduce overall costs of the policy by 
slowing down growth in renewable energy technologies through a 
reduction of feed-in tariffs, and also to encourage the use of organic and 
farming waste as feedstocks [173]. In the EU, around 5% of manure from 
pigs was treated in anaerobic digesters in 2010. Denmark even managed 
to process more than 30%. 
The study draws on the policies above to set the following bench-
mark: 50% of manure from the livestock sector is assumed to be treated 
in anaerobic digesters by 2030. This benchmark is line with the 
assessment of the technical potential within the EU, which is estimated 
to be 50% and can, in the case of individual countries, go up to 80%, 
depending on current average farm size and structure [174]. Under 
favourable policy conditions, an even more widespread adoption of 
anaerobic digesters could be anticipated, in particular on small-scale 
farms [175,176]. 
3.7.2. Limiting emissions from rice paddies 
Among the rice-producing countries, Vietnam stands out thanks to its 
long-term efforts. Following several initial economic reforms in the early 
1980s, which enabled individual farmers to gain some degree of market 
access, and brought about the first jump in rice yield, Vietnam adopted 
the Doi Moi plan in 1986. This market-oriented policy reform allowed 
markets to play a greater role in the allocation of economic resources 
and caused a decentralisation of production from collectives to indi-
vidual farm households [177]. Over the next decades, following addi-
tional reforms, such as investment in infrastructure and irrigation, land 
reform, and subsidies, Vietnam transformed itself from a rice importer to 
one of the world’s leading exporters [178]. Sustained yield growth 
through the adoption of new varieties (the adoption rate was around 
90% by 2000), increased irrigation and improved fertilisation [177,179, 
180] recently resulted in a stabilisation of harvested area [181]. Ac-
cording to FAOSTAT, this development coincided with a stabilisation of 
CH4 emissions from rice production in the period from 2000 to 2010, but 
in contrast, the country itself still reported to the UNFCCC an increase in 
emissions from 37.5 to 44.5 MtCO2e per year during the same period 
[182]. 
Based on the policies presented above, the study sets the following 
benchmark: a doubling of efficiency gains in GHG reduction from the 
historical global yearly average of 1%–2% by 2030. The scenario 
thereby foresees a reduction in the emissions of CH4 from the agricul-
tural sector. 
3.8. The land use, land use-change and forestry (LULUCF) 
sector: zero deforestation 
The change in forest area is one of the key indicators to understand 
developments in the ecological and environmental services that forests 
provide. According to Keenan et al. [183], the world’s forest area is still 
declining, but the rate of global net loss of forest area did decrease by 
over 50% in the periods between 1990 and 2000, and between 2010 and 
2015. The focus countries of this study play a limited role in the sector, 
but other countries have implemented comprehensive policy packages 
(see Table 11). They intend to increase their forest area by putting 
forward policies to reduce deforestation, increase afforestation and 
protect areas at risk of being converted. 
Brazil has historically shown the strongest performance in reducing 
deforestation. Data from its National Institute for Space Research in-
dicates a reduction of the deforestation rate in the Amazon biome from a 
peak year with 29,059 km2 of forest loss to a historical low in 2012 when 
4571 km2 was lost [184]. The reduction is due to the implementation of 
the government’s regulatory measures, such as the Brazil Forest Code, 
and the improvement of supply chains [185]. The private sector has also 
played a major role in tackling deforestation issues in Brazil. An example 
is the implementation of the 2006 Soy Moratorium in the Amazon. This 
agreement between civil society, industry, and government prohibits the 
purchase of soy grown on recently deforested land, thereby helping to 
reduce the deforestation rate. If it was expanded to the Cerrado biome, it 
could also serve to slow down the deforestation of this area and thereby 
contribute to further reductions in deforestation rates at the national 
level [186]. Nevertheless, at present the deforestation rate in Brazil is 
rising and if legal treaties are not enforced the trend may continue 
[187]. 
The experience of Brazil suggests that a strong reduction in the 
deforestation rate can be achieved when civil society, industries and 
governments work together to implement and enforce relevant policies. 
In the period between 2004 and 2012, Brazil achieved an average 5% 
Table 11 
Most relevant policies to increase the national forest area.  
Country/ 
region 
Existing policy measure Indicator value 
China Nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (2016) [192]; 
the 13th Five-year plan [189] 
Increasing the forest area by 40 
million hectares and the forest 
stock volume by 1.3 billion m3 
from 2005 levels by 2020. 
Increase the forest cover to 23% 
and increase the forest growing 
stock to 16.5 billion m3. 
EU EU Biodiversity Strategy (2020) 
[191] 
Three billion new trees are 
planted in the EU, fully 
adhering to ecological 
principles. 
India Green India Mission (2011) 
[193] 
Increase the forest cover in 
moderately dense forests: 5 
million hectares. 
Improve forest cover of forest 
areas: 5 million hectares 
Japan No relevant policies found N/A 
United 
States 
No relevant policies found N/A 
Argentina Environmental and Insurance 
Sustainability Program [194]; 
investments for cultivated forests 
[195] 
Increase forest plantations from 
1.3 million hectares to 2 million 
hectares by 2030. 
Development of afforestation 
projects on a total of 500,000 
ha. 
Brazil The Brazilian Forest code (2012) 
[196] 
Restoring and reforesting 12 
million hectares of forests by 
2030. 
Plan for Prevention and Control 
of Deforestation in the Amazon 
(2004) [197] 
Zero illegal deforestation by 
2030 in the Amazon biome. 
Action Plan for the Prevention 
and Control of Deforestation and 
Forest Fires in the Cerrado biome 
(2010) [198] 
N/A 
Colombia Increase of the area of protected 
forest land in the Amazon [199] 
Increase area of protected forest 
land in the Amazon to 38 
million hectares. 
Chile National Strategy for Climate 
Change and Vegetation 
Resources (2010) [200] 
Afforest 100,000 ha of land with 
mainly native tree species. 
Indonesia Presidential instruction, 
August 2018 [201] 
Three-year moratorium on the 
expansion of palm oil 
plantations.  
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reduction per year, resulting in a drop in its national deforestation rate 
of as much as 84%. If the country manages to reverse the current trend 
and return to pre-2012 developments, it will see its deforestation rate 
reaching zero before 2030. 
China has a long history of implementing ambitious policies to in-
crease the area and the quality of their national forests. These have led to 
an increase in forest cover from 8.6% in 1949 to 18.21% in 2003 [188]. 
The 13th five-year plan sets the target of increasing the national forest 
cover to 23% [189]. This is in line with the longer-term Chinese plans for 
afforestation projects to increase the total forest cover by about 40 
million hectares from 2005 to 2020 [190]. 
In the EU, there are no union-wide policies directly targeted at 
reducing the level of legally permitted deforestation carried out within 
the Member States. However, the 2020 EU Biodiversity Strategy sets 
clear and quantitative targets for afforestation and the protection of land 
within Europe [191]. 
There are several countries that do not belong to the focus group of 
this study but do have relevant policies for increasing forest area and 
reducing deforestation. Those include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile and Indonesia. 
In addition to individual national legislations, there is the New York 
Declaration on Forests (NYDF) which was signed by governments, 
companies, non-governmental organisations and indigenous organisa-
tions [202] Aiming to halt the global net loss of forest area while 
simultaneously enhancing food security, the NYDF presents 10 action 
points, or goals, including targets for deforestation and land restoration 
by 2020 and 2030. In terms of deforestation, one of its key actions points 
is to end naturally occurring forest loss by 2030, with a 50% reduction 
by 2020 as a milestone toward full achievement [203]. The 2019 
assessment report indicates that achieving the 2020 target is “likely 
impossible” and that larger scale, more coordinated action is needed to 
bring the 2030 target within reach [204]. 
4. Explorative scenario analysis: impact on emissions of 
replicating sector progress globally 
The sector progress achieved by successful past policies and aimed at 
by forward-looking policies (see Table 1) was applied to all countries by 
changing the parameters in both models for projections about the period 
2015 to 2030 relative to the current polices scenario. This resulted in an 
estimation of global GHG emissions that peak around 2020 and decline 
afterwards (Fig. 2). By 2030, emissions would decrease to 46.6–48.6 
GtCO2e per year from 51.5 GtCO2e in 2015. This corresponds to re-
ductions of 11.7–12.1 GtCO2e, or 19–21%, by 2030, compared to the 
current policies scenario 
At the global level, the largest emissions reductions in 2030 come 
from the power sector (5.3–5.6 GtCO2e per year), followed by the sectors 
LULUCF (2.2 GtCO2e per year), transport (0.8–1.2 GtCO2e per year) and 
industry (0.9–1.1 GtCO2e per year). The reductions in emissions stem-
ming from electricity generation are partly due a fall in the demand for 
electricity, caused by factors such as efficiency improvement of devices. 
On the other hand, the growth of electrified transport leads to an in-
crease in demand. Overall, the change in electricity consumption after 
replicating sectoral progress is small: the demand in 2030 results in 1% 
less than in the scenario under current policies in the bottom-up calcu-
lations (data point not available for TIMER/IMAGE). 
In all the analysed countries, the most stringent NDC targets would 
be overachieved under a scenario that globally replicates successful 
policies (see Table 12). The largest reductions are achieved in the 
electricity production sector in nearly all major economies, except 
Mexico, where the current share of coal-fired power generation is 
already low (11% in 2015). Similarly, in Brazil the reduction in the 
LULUCF sector amounts to up to 190 MtCO2e per year by 2030, ac-
counting for up to half of the total possible reduction for Brazil identified 
in this study. The application of successful energy and GHG policies has 
a clear impact on Russia, achieving emissions reductions of 26%–35% 
relative to current policies scenario projections. The country has sig-
nificant mitigation potential with regard to fugitive emissions from oil 
and gas production (200 MtCO2e per year in 2030) and F-gas emissions. 
As for developing countries, the effect of reductions in F-gas emis-
sions under the Kigali Amendment by 2030 is found to be relatively 
small because stringent consumption caps will not be in place until after 
2030, and there will be a time lag until the impact of caps becomes 
visible in terms of reduced emissions. 
Table 12 provides ranges of emissions projections that reflect the 
uncertainty of the results for all countries. For example, emissions pro-
jections for India are subject to considerable uncertainty related to 
economic growth assumptions. In Japan, decisions on the future of nu-
clear energy will strongly influence the development of emissions in the 
power sector. In Brazil, projected emissions from land use are unsure. 
The global results and most of the sectoral results are comparable to 
outcomes produced by other studies (see SI 4). 
Fig. 2. Global GHG emissions (including those from LULUCF). The grey segment of each bar represents emissions forecasts under the scenario of replicated sectoral 
progress in 2030; the coloured segment represents emissions reductions stemming from the implemented policies. 
Note: For comparison, the graph includes the emission ranges for 2030 of the UNEP Emissions Gap Report [3]. These are, more specifically, the 10th to 90th 
percentile estimates of the total GHG emissions by 2030 under three different scenarios: the current policies scenario, the unconditional and conditional NDC 
scenario, and the below 2◦C and 1.5◦C scenario. 
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5. Discussion 
5.1. Significance of this study 
The review of policies in this study shows that the historical per-
formance and expected outcomes of future measures vary significantly 
across countries. This is not only explained by the degree of policy 
implementation, but also by other factors, such as the pace of economic 
development in the years observed and market forces. This study has 
found that in the past, OECD countries such as the EU Member States, 
Japan, Norway and the United States, tended to implement policy 
packages that led to more rapid progress in improvements to energy 
intensity and GHG intensity, in comparison to emerging economies and 
developing countries. However, major emitting developing countries are 
now catching up and are increasingly implementing similar packages 
(for example for fuel efficiency of passenger cars), which in some cases 
are more aggressive than those of many OECD countries; a case in 
question is China’s policy on electric vehicles. It is further important to 
consider that in major emitting economies, such as India or China, even 
if relative values develop more slowly, the absolute increase of mitiga-
tion technologies is more substantive than in smaller countries. At 
several points, the analysis presents comparisons of relative and abso-
lute figures. Examples of substantive gains are capacity additions for 
renewable energy and the numbers of electric vehicles introduced in 
certain countries. These developments influence global markets and 
drive down costs in other countries as well. 
The analysis performed here has identified examples of successful 
policies that have led to clear deviation from business-as-usual trends in 
energy use and GHG emissions in the following sectors: renewable 
electricity, passenger vehicles (fuel efficiency and promotion of zero- 
emission vehicles), and forestry. For other sectors such as industry and 
buildings, which are often considered as hard-to-abate sectors, the 
comparable information available is too limited to allow any conclu-
sions to be drawn. For the industry and freight transport sectors, no 
relevant historical policies or forward-looking policies were identified in 
the five major emitting economies. 
Of the examples observed in this paper, some have clearly changed 
trends in the sectors. Policy makers in other countries could learn from 
these good examples and use them as benchmarks for their own ambi-
tion. For a complete picture, policy making should further consider 
national circumstances and ensure compatibility with the mitigation 
requirements of the Paris Agreement. 
The results of the explorative quantitative assessment show that 
replicating sector progress globally (see Section 4) can significantly 
change the current trend in global emissions. However, the resulting 
level of progress in each sector is still insufficient for respecting the 
temperature limits of the Paris Agreement. 
5.2. Limitations and uncertainties of this study 
The research methods used in this study have faced some limitations. 
First, the policy review focuses on major emitting economies, and even 
among those, inadequate availability of information narrows the anal-
ysis. The analysis focuses mostly on national-level policies, but more 
ambitious or more effective schemes may exist on a subnational or city 
level. 
Second, there is not always a direct link between the implemented 
policies and progress in the studied sectors. Many other developments 
influence the trends in the sectors. 
Third, the quantitative analysis is based on the assumption that the 
historically observed performance of a country can be replicated around 
the world and over a long time. Some successful policies identified in 
this study are in part driven by political objectives that are unrelated to 
climate change mitigation (e.g. reducing air pollution or enhancing 
energy security). Countries with similar ambitions for their sectoral in-
dicators may be driven by widely varying reasons. There are, for 
example, many different arguments that support an increase in the 
market share of electric vehicles. One key element is having the power to 
actually execute policies, and this varies, depending on factors such as 
the level of community organization, culture and levels of educational 
attainment. This study does not provide a recipe for countries on how to 
effectively implement ambitious climate policies and achieve the level of 
performance observed in exemplary cases. It does not either consider the 
political developments in the countries, such as the withdrawal of the US 
from the Paris Agreement. 
Fourth, this study has not assessed whether the identified policies 
and their performance are cost-effective, fully account for national cir-
cumstances, are compatible with national processes and priorities, and 
are in the interest of stakeholders in the countries where they are 
replicated. The replication of good practice policies in other countries 
around the world requires careful consideration of national circum-
stances and criteria that go further than emissions reductions alone. This 
also includes differentiating the mitigative capacity of countries based 
on their level of development. In this regard, this study has taken a 
simplified approach of differentiating the time horizon of policy 
implementation in cases where the policy area is heavily influenced by 
the level of income of the population affected by the policy. 
The fifth limitation relates to the time horizon of this study. It is 
assumed that the good practice policies can be implemented without 
significant delays in countries around the world, starting in 2018. The 
starting year is a critical assumption: the development of effective policy 
packages can be complex and require a significant amount of research, 
Table 12 
GHG emissions projections (including emissions from LULUCF) by 2030 under the current policies scenario and under the good practice policies scenario in major 
emitting economies. Emissions values are based on IPCC-SAR GWPs. Unit: MtCO2e per year.   
Brazil Canada China EU India Japan Mexico Russia South 
Africa 
USA 
Current policies scenario 
GHG emissions 
(MtCO2e/yr) 
1110–1470 530–590 13,000–14,100 3280–3530 4510–5100 930–1050 760–790 2120–2130 650–760 4790–5730 
Replicated sector progress scenario 
GHG emissions 
(MtCO2e/yr) 
780–1010 380–480 10,600–11,280 2430–2780 3390–4100 770–840 670–730 1470–1660 520–590 3640–4530 
Reductions relative 
to the current 
policies scenario 
30%–31% 19%– 
29% 
18%–20% 21%–26% 19%–25% 17%–19% 8%–12% 21%–31% 20%–22% 21%–24% 
Emissions change 
vs. 2015 levels 
− 40% to 
− 22% 
− 34% to 
− 16% 
− 5% to − 1% − 38% to 
− 29% 
+26% to 
+53% 
− 39% to 
− 33% 
+3% to 
+12% 
− 21% to 
− 11% 
− 7% to 
+6% 
− 36% to 
− 20% 
NDC scenario (For comparison: NDC target range in IPCC-SAR GWPs based on UNEP [205]) 
Unconditional 
(conditional) 
NDC (MtCO2e/yr) 
1200 520 13,400–14,800 2960–3290 4050–6220 950–1040 730–760 
(600–620) 
2410–2740 610 
(400–610) 
4740–4870 
(in 2025)  
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and therefore it can take years of preparation for policies to be fully 
implemented. Further, the study set 2030 as the target year and does not 
consider the longer-term implications which are important for a tran-
sition to net-zero-CO2 emissions by around 2050. The study does not 
assess the transformation impact of the policies in the long-term. The 
policies need to be complemented with cost-effective instruments with a 
long-term vision [7]. Examples are a price on carbon, or specific support 
for negative emissions technologies, e.g. through reforestation. 
Sixth, the article does not delve into various sectors that may be 
critical for some countries and are essential to consider in the global 
transition to Paris-compatible pathways: waste, international shipping 
and aviation, and aspects of industrial processes other than F-gases and 
efficiency. 
Lastly, as in all attempts to estimate future trends, there is uncer-
tainty in the projected emissions. The two models used for this research 
make different assumptions about economic and sector-specific tech-
nological developments and about policy implementation rates. In 
addition, there are several country-specific conditions which add to the 
uncertainty (see Section 4). The estimates of countries’ GHG emissions 
relative to 2015 levels vary between the two models: in five cases, the 
variations are less than 10%, and in five others they range from 10% to 
20%. Overall, the emissions projections under the current policies sce-
narios of this study are compatible to emissions projections from other 
national and global models (for a comparison, see Ref. [3,206]). 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This article reviews climate change mitigation policies that lead to 
reduced GHG emissions, compared to scenarios without such policies. 
Focusing on the largest emitting economies, it describes the policies and 
illustrates the expected or actual sector progress they bring about. In-
dicators for energy intensity and GHG intensity illustrate and compare 
progress in the sectors. In a second step, the research makes the 
assumption that all countries are able to replicate the most ambitious 
progress in each sector. Explorative scenarios use the IMAGE model and 
bottom-up calculations to provide per-sector estimates of GHG emis-
sions under their own particular conditions. 
Historical performance and expected outcomes of future targets vary 
across countries. This study has found that in the past, OECD countries 
such as the EU Member States, Japan, Norway and the United States, 
tended to implement policy packages that led to more rapid progress in 
improvements to energy intensity and GHG intensity, in comparison to 
emerging economies and developing countries. However, major emit-
ting developing countries are now catching up and are increasingly 
implementing similar or even more aggressive packages than those of 
many OECD countries. 
The level of implementation of mitigation policies varies also per 
sector. There are many policies that have led to clear deviation from 
business-as-usual trends in energy use and GHG emissions related to 
renewable electricity, passenger vehicles and forestry. For industry and 
buildings, the comparable information available is too limited to allow 
any conclusions to be drawn. For the industry and freight transport 
sectors, no ambitious historical policies or forward-looking policies were 
identified in the five major emitting economies. 
Global replication of successful sector-level policies and their per-
formance will definitely reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 
compared to levels achieved under current policies. Even so, the 
resulting level of sector progress still does not keep the world on track to 
measure up to the challenge of meeting the temperature limits of the 
Paris Agreement by 2030. To fulfil the Paris goals, countries therefore 
need to very rapidly expand their actions over and beyond historical 
efforts. The findings of this study include the following recommenda-
tions thereto:  
• develop comprehensive policy packages with financial incentives, 
which address user behaviour and limit administrative barriers;  
• provide long-term security to actors in the sector;  
• focus on underdeveloped sectors (in terms of technology or coverage 
by the policy framework), where countries have the capacity to do 
so; building up transformative policy frameworks for those sectors 
can drive corresponding climate action around the world and is 
therefore also a responsibility of OECD countries. 
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Appendix A Tools used and methods applied for emissions 
projections 
Two different quantification frameworks were used to make the 
projections of energy- and process-related GHG emissions (except those 
from the agriculture sector) and F-gases emissions under the current 
policies scenario and the good practices scenario: the IMAGE model and 
bottom-up calculations based on existing external scenarios (see below 
and Supporting Information). The GHG emissions from the LULUCF 
sector as well as the agriculture sector were projected using GLOBIOM 
and G4M models (see below and the Supporting Information). The 
projections are expressed in terms of IPCC-SAR GWPs. 
A.1. IMAGE integrated assessment modelling framework 
The first set of projections calculated the impact of individual pol-
icies in different subsectors using the IMAGE integrated assessment 
modelling framework [30], which includes models for energy systems 
(TIMER) and land use. The starting point for the calculations of the 
impact of climate policies was the SSP2 baseline (i.e. no climate policy) 
as implemented in the IMAGE model [30]. The impact of current climate 
and energy policies in G20 countries, as identified in the CD-LINKS 
project [16], was fed into the model and resulted in additional GHG 
emission reductions to the baseline [31]. For this projection, current 
policies were translated into quantitative policy indicators that could be 
used in the model. The methodology for calculating the impact of the 
policies and targets on emissions for the global replication of successful 
policies scenario for the IMAGE model (including the TIMER energy 
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model) is described in detail in Section S1 of the Supporting 
Information. 
A.2. Bottom-up calculations based on existing external scenarios 
The second set of emissions projections was made by applying a 
bottom-up quantification of individual policy impacts using publicly 
available sector-level reference emissions projections as a starting point. 
The development of projections under the current policies scenario is 
described in Kuramochi et al. [16], and is here also outlined in detail in 
Section S2 of the Supporting Information. The starting point for the 
calculation of current policies emissions projections is a publicly avail-
able baseline policy scenario for economy-wide GHG emissions and 
energy-related CO2 emissions, that draws on government documents 
and projections made by international organisations such as the IEA. 
After making the projections, the study examined whether the baseline 
scenario considered all the important policies implemented to date. If a 
specific policy exerting a substantial impact was found to have been left 
out, the emission and energy use projections were adjusted to reflect 
this. 
To calculate the impact of replicating progress globally, the authors 
adapted sector-specific, simplified stock turnover models developed for 
the power, buildings and transport sectors. These adapted versions were 
derived from the models used and described in Kriegler et al. [7]. The 
tool developed for F-gas emissions projections collected historical data 
from three databases [207–209] and the development of the current 
policies scenario projections was based on work by the US EPA [172] 
and government submissions to the UNFCCC. See Section S1.2 of the 
Supporting Information for a detailed description of the tools. 
A.3. GLOBIOM and G4M models for land-use sector calculations 
Both the bottom-up calculations and the IMAGE scenario calcula-
tions were supplemented with others on LULUCF CO2 and agricultural 
policies, using the IIASA global land-use model GLOBIOM [210] and the 
global forest model G4M [211]. To ensure consistency between model 
scenarios, the SSP2 baseline was selected as the starting point for the 
calculations by GLOBIOM and G4M [212]. To illustrate comprehensive 
results, IIASA’s LULUCF CO2 and agriculture emissions projections were 
added to the GHG emission projections made by IMAGE and the 
bottom-up calculations. 
A detailed description of the tools presented above, including the 
description of quantification of individual policy impacts, can be found 
in section S3 of the Supporting Information. 
Appendix B. Supplementary data 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi. 
org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110602. 
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[16] Kuramochi T, Höhne N, Gonzales-Zuñiga S, Hans F, Sterl S, Hagemann M, et al. 
Greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios for major emitting countries. Analysis of 
current climate policies and mitigation commitments: 2017 update. NewClimate 
Institute, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA); 2017. 
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8 - energy end use: industry. Global energy assessment - towards a sustainable 
future. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, Laxenburg, Austria: Cambridge 
University Press; 2012. p. 513–74. 
[97] UNIDO. Global industrial energy efficiency benchmarking: an energy policy tool. 
Working paper november 2010. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization; 2010. 
[98] U.S.DOE. Advanced manufacturing office. 2020. https://www.energy.gov/eere/ 
amo/advanced-manufacturing-office. [Accessed 5 July 2020]. 
[99] U.S. DOE. SEP 50001 Program 2020. https://betterbuildingssolutioncenter.ene 
rgy.gov/iso-50001/sep-50001. [Accessed 5 July 2020]. 
[100] The State Council. 国务院关于印发⟪中国制造2025⟫的通知 (notice of the state 
Council on the issuance of “made in China 2025”). Bejing, China: State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China; 2015. 
[101] European Parliament. Directive 2012/27/EU of the European parliament and of 
the Council of 25 october 2012 on energy efficiency. 2012. https://doi.org/ 
10.3000/19770677.L_2012.315.eng. 
[102] European Parliament. Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC: 2003/87/EC, 
vol. 275; 2003. 
[103] Keidanren. Voluntary action on the environment. Tokyo, Japan: Keidanren; 1997. 
[104] METI. Energy conservation policies of Japan. November 7, 2011. Tokyo, Japan: 
Agency of Natural Resources and Energy Energy Conservation and Renewable 
Energy Department, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; 2011. 
[105] U.S.DOE. Better plants Program. U.S. Department of Energy; 2020. 
[106] European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Directive 2010/31/ 
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy 
performance of buildings (recast). 2010. 
[107] BPIE. Nearly zero-energy buildings. Definitions across Europe. Brussels, Belgium: 
Buildings Performance Institute Europe; 2016. 
[108] Bundesgesetzblatt. Zweite Verordnung zur Änderung der 
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